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THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS
CORNELIUS F. MURPHY, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
The Middle East conflict is incendiary. The inability of Jews
and Arabs to determine the future of Palestine peacefully has led to a
deepening sense of insecurity in the entire world community- fears
which become more acute as the conflict draws the Great Powers to-
wards a Mediterranean confrontation. It is important that Americans
understand the reasons for the interminable violence, if only to shape
national positions toward the Near East upon intelligent understanding
rather than emotional response. We must know why these two Semitic
peoples, living in an area sacred to three religions, have come to a posi-
tion of such vehement hostility.
Both of the following articles should stimulate intelligent discus-
sion of the conflict. The first, by the Honorable Yoram Dinstein,
Israeli Consul in New York, contains his own argument about the
legitimate forms of self-defense available to Israel. The recent increase
in terrorist activity makes Mr. Dinstein's article particularly timely.
The second, co-authored by M. Cherif Bassiouni, Professor of Law at
DePaul University, and Eugene Fisher, contains a detailed analysis of
the history of conflicting aspirations in the Middle East, which are
seen as a conflict between Zionism and Arab nationalism. Whether or
not one agrees with their characterization, the reader will find the
article rich in a historical perspective which can be of considerable
value to the balanced formation of public and professional opinion.
In this introductory essay no effort will be made to evaluate each
article in detail. Rather, I shall critically discuss some of the major
points raised in each paper, concluding with some remarks on the
means by which I believe a durable peace can be obtained.
SELF-DEFENSE
What are the legitimate uses of defensive force in the modern
world? This is a major contemporary question of international order,
and one for which we have no completely satisfactory answer. The
Vietnam War has made the problem acute here in America, and the
international community is far from a consensus as to when violent
self-help is admissible in interstate relations. For Israel, the legitimate
* Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. B.S., College of the Holy
Cross, 1954; J.D., Boston College, 1957; LL.M., University of Virginia, 1962.
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uses of force are a daily problem, for she has had to adopt forceful
responses to manifold threats to her existence.
Normal difficulties in delineating legitimate response have been
compounded by the regime of nonviolence contemplated by the cre-
ation of the United Nations. Under the Charter, primary responsibility
for peace-keeping has been vested in the Security Council, with a
limited use of defensive force reserved for the state which suffers an
assault. Article 51 provides that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Coun-
cil has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security.1
The controversy, of course, centers around the phrase "if an armed
attack occurs." The reader who is out of sympathy with the difficulty
may recall the agony which this language imposed upon those who
wished to defend the action of President Kennedy interdicting the
shipment of missiles to Cuba. It is to Mr. Dinstein's credit that he does
not avoid these difficulties in his efforts to justify the Israeli initiatives
in the June 1967 war. He concedes that the weight of authority inter-
prets Article 51 as precluding preventive counter measures which may
have been legitimate under customary international law, arguing in-
stead that, in the light of events leading up to the commencement of
hostilities, the Israeli response can be defended as the exercise of an
interceptive, rather than preventive, use of force.2 He elaborates further
on other forms of defense to the nuances of attack which have become
prevalent after the Six Day War. The reader will find of interest the
distinction offered between "reprisal" -which assumes at least the
complicity of the target state- and "execution," explained as the
employment of force against individuals located within the territory
of another state in retribution for acts which they have committed
without the direct involvement of the target country.3 The increases
in Arab guerilla activity make the latter category particularly pertinent
to current affairs.
Much of Mr. Dinstein's argumentation is persuasive, but, on the
whole, it prescinds too much from the objectives of the United Nations
to be morally cogent. This is probably due to the radical state-cen-
1 U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
2 Dinstein, The Legal Issues of "Para-War" and Peace in the Middle East, infra at 468.
Quincy Wright agrees that Egypt's actions constituted an armed attack, but questions
whether Israel's reaction was purely defensive. Wright, The Middle East Crisis Working
Paper, in THE MmDLE EAST: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE 1, 34 (I. Shapiro ed. 1969).
3 Dinstein, infra at 471 et seq.
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teredness which characterizes the arguments, i.e., a tendency to con-
ceptualize problems exclusively in terms of his nation's interests. The
notion of reprisal, for example, cannot be adequately understood with-
out explicit consideration of demands for redress, a dimension which
is absent from his analysis.4 More importantly, the entire discussion of
self-defense fails to comprehend the jural significance of Israel's mem-
bership in the United Nations.
The purpose of article 51 is to justify temporary measures of
self-defense pending effective United Nations intervention. But Security
Council impotence is a harsh reality for Israel; the threats and use of
force against her have made optimistic reliance upon international
authority impossible. Yet, experience of ineffectiveness cannot be
transformed into total disregard; the development of such an attitude
poses too grave a danger to world order. Unfortunately, such seems to
be a direction of Mr. Dinstein's reasoning. He argues that Arab assaults
may reach a point where, instead of limited countermeasures such as
reprisal and execution, a total war could become the justifiable re-
action:
War, as a measure of self-defense, denotes a full-scale use of
counterforce. Unlike reprisal, war, once launched, does not have to
be proportional to the force initially employed by the enemy. It is
of the essence of war that (subject to the rules of conduct in war-
fare, i.e., the jus in bello) all acts designed to effectuate the overall
collapse of the enemy are permissible. By way of illustration, after
Pearl Harbor the United States could, and indeed did, seek the un-
conditional surrender of the enemy, and not merely retribution for
the severe blow to its naval power.
It would appear that Webster's test must be reconstituted, per-
mitting the waging of war in self-defense in response to an isolated
instance of armed attack, when justified by a reasonable combina-
tion of urgency and necessity. Whether this reasonable combination
exists depends, of course, on the merits of each individual case.
... Once a State has used sufficient force to justify, in the
light of reasonable urgency and necessity, response by war as self-
defense it cannot demand that the State subjected to attack dimin-
ish the quantum of counterforce....
Subjected to armed attacks by and from neighboring Arab
countries on a daily basis, the State of Israel is continually con-
fronted with the option to respond to force with counterforce, and,
4 See Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 ArM- J. Ir'L
L. 415, 432-33 (1969); but see the reply in Blum, The Beirut Raid and the International
Double Standard, 64 Am. J. INT'L L. 73, 87-89 (1970).
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if it so chooses, to respond by reaction, reprisal, execution, or war.
... [I]n the long run, it would seem that another full-scale war in
the Middle East cannot be averted unless an end is put to the
"para-war" that persists.5
One can sympathize with the Israeli dilemma of whether to utilize
measures of self-help or resort to a dormant supranational authority.
Nevertheless, the argument for absolute defensive war cannot be re-
conciled with continued allegiance to the United Nations. The or-
ganization, founded to relieve man from the horrors of unrestrained
violence, permits temporary use of defensive force, but only with a
view to the overall preservation of life. An extreme of defensive rights
is plausible only upon the assumption that United Nations' peace-
keeping authority is nonexistent, a thesis which cannot be maintained
in light of the historical record.
A further difficulty with the general argument lies in its implicit
premise that whenever peace-keeping machinery is inoperative, the
obligations of a member state to the pacific objectives of the organiza-
tion correspondingly diminish. Consider, for example, Mr. Dinstein's
discussion of the Security Council's Resolution of November 22, 1967,
calling for an end to the status of belligerency, stressing the inadmissi-
bility of territorial acquisition by war, and demanding the establish-
ment of a lasting peace to be achieved by the parties with the assistance
of a Special United Nations Representative. 6
In assessing its significance, Mr. Dinstein argues that the resolution
is not legally binding because it was adopted within the bounds of
Chapter VI, rather than Chapter VII, of the Charter. This is premised
upon the theory that only decisions, as distinguished from recommen-
dations, of the Security Council are capable of imposing legal obliga-
tions.7 Chapter VI of the Charter, dealing with the pacific settlement
of disputes, assigns the Council the task of recommending appropriate
measures for the settlement. But although the November resolution
does not impose legal duties, it refers to existing legal obligations. By
a form of horizontal ordering, the member States have agreed among
themselves that they will settle their disputes by peaceful means.8 The
5 Dinstein, infra at - (footnote omitted). "Webster's test" is a standard of over-
whelming necessity used as the measure of legitimate defensive response. It was first
articulated in the Caroline case and has been subsequently utilized to measure the full-
scale use of defensive counterforce. See generally The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 Am.
J. INT'L L. 82 (1938).
6 S.C. Res. 142, U.N. Doc. S/8247 (1967).
7 For a more general analysis of the distinction, see I. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LA~W 429 (8th ed. 1955). See also Corfu Channel Case, I.C.J. Preliminary Objection 15
(1947).
8 Article 2.3 of the Charter provides that "all members shall settle their international
1970]
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failure to account for the existence of legal duties which the Resolution
recognizes but does not create is a fallacy based upon a positivistic
analysis of the Charter. Because the Security Council cannot impose
a norm under Chapter VI, a positivistic analysis concludes that the
resolution is without jural significance. Geared to "vertical" forms of
thought, it fails to see that a legal duty can exist even if a superior
power is not authorized to threaten a sanction for its violation.9
The above remarks have been addressed principally against the
Israeli attitudes towards force because the Dinstein article directly
raises such questions. Similar criticisms can be made of Arab attitudes
throughout the Middle East crisis, even though questions of force are
not directly raised by the Bassiouni-Fisher paper. It suffices to note
that the persistent belligerency which has been official Arab policy
since 1948 is as incompatible with the objectives of the United Nations
as are the extremes of Israeli theories of self-defense. Indeed, it should
be said that neither side has fully comprehended the sense in which
the Charter constitutes a commitment of the people of the world to
peace rather than war. The inexorable logic of Israeli reasoning on
self-defense, as well as the Arab commitment to Palestinian liberation,
has driven both sides a long way from the modalities of peaceful settle-
ment envisioned by the Charter. Should they continue to inflame their
differences with violence, they, and the entire world, face a frightening
future. Within such a framework, escalation of the Middle East arms
race is assured, and further bloodshed inevitable. The potentials for
death and destruction which may flow from this armed intransigence
are incalculable, especially if it leads to a nuclear confrontation by the
Great Powers. Thus it is imperative that antagonisms be transformed
into a spirit of genuine reconciliation.
PEACEFUL SETrLEMENT
The Bassiouni-Fisher paper, devoted to problems of peaceful
settlement, demonstrates how the issues can be expressed in a jural
form suitable for adjudication. Framing a series of arguments generally
favorable to the Arab position, the authors indicate that the basic
questions are not submitted to a tribunal for resolution because of the
psycho-political underpinnings of the controversy. The suggestion of
adjudication requires some comment. The idea is attractive, and one
which the present writer has previously supported. But further reflec-
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered." U.N. CHARTER art 2, para. 3. (Emphasis added.)




tion leads to a conclusion that the proposal, while inherently plausible,
is not suitable for the actual resolution of the present dispute. In
addition, the very raising of the possibility in a paper sympathetic to
the Arab cause has ramifications which deserve consideration.
Objection could be taken to the idea of adjudication on the
grounds that the matter is really a "political" controversy which is not
susceptible to judicial treatment even if the differences between the
parties can be expressed in legal terminology. Perhaps the article
anticipates this in its analysis of the psychological aspects of the dis-
pute. Nevertheless it should be noted that the proposals are basically
unworkable because the jurisdiction of the World Court can only be
effectively utilized when the general relationship between the parties
is peaceful. Professor Sohn has shown how the Court can only gradually
develop its authority by the careful submission of relatively innocuous
questions by countries who are basically on friendly terms.10 One can-
not realistically expect the Court to handle questions of vital moment
to States that have been in violent conflict for over twenty years.
What is of importance are the underlying attitudes which such
proposals suggest. Since the 1948 war (and especially in the November
1967 Resolution), the Security Council has endeavored to draw the
participants into a posture of direct negotiation. As pointed out earlier,
the parties have failed to fulfill the legal obligations to negotiate which
exist even if the resolution is not of itself obligatory. But the Arab
nations have consistently refused to engage in that direct discussion
and exchange of differences which the nature of the conflict requires.
And it must be said that the present proposals relative to adjudication
appear as an extension of that evasion.
One obstacle to negotiation, which Bassiouni and Fisher correctly
point out, is that Western observers tend to view the dispute as a
problem of interstate relations, while, in fact, the conflict is also be-
tween the aspirations of Zionism and Arab nationalism with respect to
Palestine." It is, in this sense, a "domestic" problem because the
antagonisms flow from differing interpretations concerning the internal
future of an entire area. When the controversy is viewed predominately
in terms of sovereign rights and responsibilities, 12 the discussion, re-
10 Sohn, Step by Step Acceptance of Jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice, 1964 PROCEEDINGS OF THE Am. Soc. OF INT'L L. 131-136, reprinted in 3 TrE
UNITED NATIONS STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER 432 (R. Falk & S. Mendlovitz ed. 1966).
11Bassiouni & Fisher, The Arab-Israeli Conflict-Real and Apparent Issues: An
Insight into Its Future from the Lessons of Its Past, infra at 399.
12 See, e.g., the November Resolution, supra note 6, para. I, ii, which provides for
"The termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledg-
ment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state
1970]
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maining on the plane of external jural relations, misses the more
humanistic aspects of the conflict. The real issues are obscured and
the possibilities of durable peace diminished.
A further complication is added by the shifting currents of Arab
nationalism. The Palestinian Arabs, with charismatic leadership, have
become a new political force in Middle East affairs. Previously repre-
sented through the existing Arab states, the Palestinians now seek to
realize their aims upon their own authority. Whether they will con-
tinue to be an independent force or become assimilated with existing
or restructured political entities remains to be seen; it is clearly possible
that some juridical recognition may be needed to make the pending
negotiations fruitful.
In any event, the Arab world - either in its existing structure or
in emerging new political forces - must bring itself within the ma-
chinery for peaceful settlement envisioned by the 1967 Security Council
Resolution. This involves recognition of, and negotiations with, the
State of Israel. A future Palestine freely composed of Jews and Arabs
may well emerge as envisioned by Bassiouni and Fisher in the conclu-
sion of their paper, but it can only evolve gradually through mutual
friendships flowing from a previous peaceful settlement.
To suggest negotiation rather than adjudication is not to argue
for politics over law; the legal points raised in the Bassiouni-Fisher
paper retain their relevance. However, the process of direct negotiation
with Israel does affect the range of moral and legal questions which are
properly relevant to the settlement. For example, the present article
goes to great lengths to demonstrate that promises made to the Zionists
by the British were without legal foundation, or at best, were subordi-
nate to Arab rights. 13 It also questions the entire process by which
Palestine was partitioned by the General Assembly and the State of
Israel created. While such considerations may be of indirect relevance,
the very nature of the negotiating process requires a narrowing of the
field of possible claims.
The historical context for responsibility is the period from 1948
to the present; a mutual assessment of conduct from that time forward
is the only rational basis upon which meaningful negotiations can
proceed. To flood the discussion with the entire history of Jewish and
Arab aspirations is bound to assure the failure of any peacemaking
efforts. Construing Arab complaints in the most favorable light, it is
in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free
from threats or acts of force."
13 E.g., Bassiouni & Fisher, infra at 426-37.
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clear to any impartial observer that the suggested time period provides
ample opportunity for the presentation of legitimate grievances.
In urging negotiations between the participants, something should
be said of the means by which they should be accomplished. Many
valuable observations have been made about the technique of direct
bargaining, 14 but little attention has been directed towards the general
negotiation structure. It is often asserted that peace can only be
negotiated through direct talks between the parties acting without any
outside interference. If by extraneous influence is meant pressure
exerted by the Great Powers, the objection is well taken. Even if they
could agree on the nature of a Middle East peace, no group of nations,
regardless of their actual power, are authorized to dictate the future
destiny of any part of the world community. And even if their influence
is persuasive rather than coercive, Big Power peacemaking efforts simply
destroy the structures of pacific settlement envisioned by the Charter.15
But if the disputants intend to negotiate without any intermediary,
there is little chance of durable peace. The November Resolution
contemplates the utilization of a Special Representative who should
"promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and ac-
cepted settlement." It is extremely important that this aspect of the
resolution be implemented.
Throughout the twentieth century, states involved in conflict
have assumed the capacity to achieve a lasting peace through their own
resources. These efforts have, in the main, failed. The punitive spirit
14 See the suggestions of Professor Fisher for implementation of the November
resolution. Fisher, Forum Proceedings, in THE MIDDLE EAST; PROSPECTS FOR PEACE, supra
note 2, at 53-55.
15 A belief that the Great Powers, by a broadening of their common interests, can
bring peace to the world is a persistent conviction of American diplomats. Former
Ambassador Ball, for example, advances the thesis that a Middle East settlement can be
achieved only if the Big Four can agree upon general terms of settlement which the
United Nations Representative Ambassador Jarring can then translate into concrete
proposals for the disputants. Ball, Slogans and Realities, 47 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 625, 628
(1969). This, of course, reflects the view that the Security Council was meant to be an
instrument by which the Great Powers could reach accord on world issues and enforce
their decisions. A continuation of that interpretation, in spite of power shifts and the
evolution of the United Nations as a political institution, is important because, as Mr.
Ball concedes, a strong United Nations may jeopardize our nation's immediate interests.
Id. at 640.
Objectively considered, any suggestion that only the Big Four can arrive at a
satisfactory solution is absurd. Should the United States continue to view its role in the
Middle East as that of Super Power with special peace-keeping duties, the results are
likely to be disastrous. Arabs and Jews are suspicious of its motives, as well as those of
the Soviet Union; the best course for the Big Four (so-called) is to follow the suggestions
in a Foreign Affairs article which follows that of Mr. Ball: disengage themselves by
restricting the flow of weapons, by avoiding propaganda efforts and most importantly, by
supporting the efforts of the United Nations Representative. Lewis, The Great Powers
and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 47 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 642 (1969).
1970]
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of the Treaty of Versailles directly contributed to the Second World
War, and the outstanding questions arising from the European phase
of that terrible conflict have never been resolved. Many would be
surprised to learn that the Korean War is at the status of an armistice
which looks towards an unfulfilled political settlement. And the failure
of the current Paris peace talks to reach a substantive agreement
should remove any doubts as to the importance of an authoritative
intermediary.
It would be tragic if the parties to the Middle East conflict failed
to profit from this historical experience. The only time in this long
conflict that the parties have reached any significant agreement was
made possible by the efforts of United Nations mediation.16 The effec-
tive presence of such assistance continues to be indispensable to lasting
peace in Palestine.
16 See the discussion of the role of Dr. Bunche in the 1949 Armistice Negotiations in
F. KHOURI, THE ARAB-ISRAELi DILEMMA 95-97 (1968).
